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The Full Federal Court's recent return to the native title field, in the Bodney v Bennell1 decision of April 2008, was
another lengthy and important addition to this difficult body of Australian jurisprudence. The primary decision of
Bennell v WA2 of 2006 concerned one distinct portion of a broader 'single Noongar application', which in its entirety
covered some 186,000 square kilometres of land and adjoining waters in the south west of WA. The separated portion,
brought on for advanced consideration in conjunction with smaller overlapping claims in that area, included the Perth
region.
The matter specifically in issue here was proof -- essentially, whether the Noongar claimants had been and remained a
'community' (or 'society') for native title purposes, had continued a sufficient acknowledgement and observance of
traditional laws and customs, and had maintained a sufficient traditional connection with the area in issue. Justice
Wilcox at first instance answered in the affirmative (except in respect of off-shore areas and islands), finding that,
subject to questions of extinguishment, native title rights and interests in the relevant area were held by a single broad
Noongar society, and concluding along the way that the modern community acknowledged and observed laws and
customs that were a recognisable adaptation of presettlement laws and customs. The Full Federal Court in Bodney v
Bennell cast significant doubt on these conclusions, setting aside Wilcox J's decision and returning the matter for
reconsideration.
First-instance decision on the claim
Wilcox J in the primary decision3 accepted the basic framework of the conventional Australian approach to proof, with
its somewhat microscoped inquiry into cultural continuity.4 His Honour particularly focused on the Yorta Yorta-bred
survival of 'society' component of the inquiry.5 However, in the face of considerable community change in the relevant
area (and the loss of many traditional practices) his Honour tempered the strict approach to proof in a variety of ways:6
o he approached the notion of 'society' with some considered flexibility and caution;7
o he expressly acknowledged the necessity of (and accommodated) community change in a variety of
contexts;8
o he expressly accommodated some difference and dissent within the relevant group -- that is, difference in
individual practices and beliefs, some disregard of the 'rules', and even some rejection of the 'society';9
o he apparently distinguished the inquiry into continuation of a 'society' from a general search for
unchanged laws and customs, indicating at various points in his 'society' discussion that he was merely
seeking continued acknowledgement of 'some' traditional laws and customs;10
o he emphasised a 'communal/inter se' distinction in dealing with the community's law and customs,11
with the implication that his microscoped inquiry into inter se rules was not a central concern in
assessing the survival of the native title interest, but rather just one tool in applying the survival of
'society' and existence of 'normative system' requirements;12 and
o upon turning to the actual survival of native title interests, he clearly adopted a 'compartmental' approach
to proof -- in essence, requiring only continuity in the law and custom underpinning the surviving native
title rights.13
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It is important to mention at this juncture, when assessing Wilcox J's apparent liberality in applying the relevant
principles, that this was a claim (and a case) that cast no doubt upon the effects of the many prior government grants
and actions that had comprehensively extinguished native title over much of the area in issue. The lands and waters
subject to such extinguishment were expressly excluded from the claim and therefore all freehold and much leasehold
land was omitted from the application.
Full Court appeal
The Full Federal Court -- comprised of Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ -- was prepared to assume, without deciding,
that Wilcox J's initial conclusion that there existed a single Noongar society (occupying the south-west) at settlement
was correct.14 However, the court proceeded to comment on a number of aspects of his Honour's approach, finding
specific error in two respects. It was held that Wilcox J had failed to properly address two matters to which the relevant
provisions of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)15 (as interpreted in the High Court decisions) drew attention.
First, it was concluded that Wilcox J had failed to properly assess whether there had been continuous acknowledgement
and observance of the traditional laws and customs by the Noongar society from sovereignty until recent times. It was
suggested that the judge had conducted an inquiry into continuity of society largely divorced from inquiry into
continuity of the presovereignty normative system. This, it was said, 'may mask unacceptable change with the
consequence that the current rights and interests are no longer those that existed at sovereignty, and thus not
traditional'.16 There appeared to be various subcomponents to this criticism of the primary judge's approach:
o that in significant contexts Wilcox J paid insufficient attention to whether each generation of the society
continued to observe the relevant laws and customs from sovereignty to the present;17
o that in important instances Wilcox J had failed to clearly consider whether post-sovereignty phenomena
(such as the 'boodja' -- the area accessible to a particular individual) were acceptable adaptations of
pre-sovereignty ones;18 and
o that Wilcox J erroneously relied upon the reasons for particular change (namely specific western
interference) in mitigation of that change, which was said to be impermissible under the Yorta Yorta
precedent.19
Apart from the question as to the relevance of the reasons for change, upon which opinion is clearly divided in the
recent jurisprudence,20 it appears that the difference between the primary judge and the appeal court may have been
more one of degree than of framework. It is not clear that Wilcox J did adopt the truncated 'society'-only version of the
inquiry (see the explanation of his methodology above). And the charge of inattention to generational continuity and the
acceptability of adaptation was perhaps more a discomfort with Wilcox J's evidential interferences and deliberate
receptivity to specific change. The true difficulty here lies in the intractably problematic nature of this assessment of
'change', an exercise that has tormented the current Australian native title jurisprudence. The Full Court acknowledged
at various points that some change to traditional laws and customs is not fatal, and added at one point (despite
ambiguity on this in the High Court decisions) that even change to the native title rights and interests themselves can in
some instances be permissible (at least where no greater burden is imposed on the sovereign title).21 However, the
assessments required here are extraordinarily difficult ones -- legally, morally and evidentially.
The problems are made worse by the Australian methodology's tendency to microscope the inquiry into cultural
continuity. The Full Court, despite its instinctive objection to Wilcox J's broader view, does hint at one methodological
correction that can mitigate this microscoping tendency. As noted above, their Honours suggested, in responding to
argument about whether 'new' rights can develop after sovereignty, that perhaps the 'true position' is that 'what cannot be
created after sovereignty are rights that impose a greater burden on the Crown's radical title'.22 Their accompanying
examples, combined with comments made elsewhere,23 indicate that they are here acknowledging (albeit less explicitly
and more cautiously than the primary judge) an important but often-neglected distinction; the distinction between the
communal (or external) native title interest and the inter se (or internal) distribution of that interest within the
community. The latter is logically of little concern to the western legal system, and hence cultural continuity in that
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regard should be less important.
The second major error that the Full Court identified in the primary judge's reasoning related to the assessment of the
claimants' 'connection' pursuant to s 223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). It was concluded that Wilcox J had
erroneously assumed that the establishment of a connection with the larger Noongar claim area meant there was
necessarily a connection with the smaller separated portion (it being a part of the larger area). The approach of Wilcox
J, viewed in the mathematical abstract is unobjectionable. So again the objection of the Full Court would seem to be not
so much to framework but to the lack of rigour and specificity in the primary judge's approach, this time in his
assessment of the claimants' connection with the relevant area (and indeed the area of the broader claim).24 Their
Honours queried, as a sub-issue here, whether Wilcox J had properly considered whether the native title was in fact
owned by the community as a whole25 (and whether native title is 'ordinarily' communal, as widely thought).26
However, this was not a matter specifically pursued in the appeals.
The Full Court particularly emphasised in this context that the inquiry into connection should not be fused or confused
with the inquiry into the existence of rights and interests under s 223(1)(a), although it was conceded that both are
sourced in traditional laws and customs and that in some cases the same evidence will be used to identify each.27 The
court seemed to draw from the distinction some support for their insistence on geographical (and sub-communal)
particularity in the connection inquiry,28 which framed the most telling criticism of the primary judge on the issue of
connection:29
... if those persons whom the laws and customs connect to a particular part of the claim area have not continued to observe without
substantial interruption the laws and customs in relation to their country, they cannot succeed in a claim for native title rights and
interests even if it be shown ... that other Noongar peoples have continued to acknowledge and observe the traditional laws and
customs of the Noongar ...
On one reading of this passage, the Full Court is breaking into internal or inter se community matters. The problems of
logic in such an approach are betrayed by the reference to the fact that in the situation described, 'they' (the particular
persons) cannot succeed in a claim for native title -- but of course it is not 'they' that have claimed, it is the community.
The broader difficulties of an inattention to the communal/inter se distinction were touched upon above. These
theoretical problems aside, the essence of the Full Court's conclusion appears to be that the primary judge did not
properly assess whether any communal native title in the hands of the Noongar community truly survived in relation to
this particular area.
Whether the primary judge's supposed digression on the matter of connection was a difference in framework or simply a
difference in flexibility of application, there are clearly conflicting views in the case law as to whether a rigorous
independent connection test should be applied on top of the identification of traditionally sourced rights and interests.30
The problem here arises from the fact that beyond the possible implications of the statutory structure, it is difficult to
understand why it is necessary for claimants to establish a connection beyond that inherent in the establishment of
traditionally sourced rights and interests in the relevant area. The risk of an insistence upon independent inquiries is, as
apparently accepted by the Full Court,31 that the microscoped inquiry into cultural continuity drifts off into
anthropological observations that may really have little relevance to any native title rights and interests.
Conclusion
The result of this appeal was that the case was remitted to the lower court for the matter to be re-examined (possibly
with this distinct area reunited with the broader Noongar south-west claim).32 Such faltering legal advances are
regrettable in this field of law. The costs and delays of a system that continually draws parties into factually and legally
complex litigation weigh heavily on all stakeholders. And in the clinical adversarial context, the questions are asked and
answered in unnatural isolation from the social, historical and political context that makes them so vitally important.
Wilcox J's primary decision in this matter appears to have been met with considerable public support in WA, perhaps
indicating that the country is now ready for a less adversarial discussion and resolution of these critical issues.
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Unfortunately the appeal result illustrates that, for now, the Noongar claimants and the Australian native title doctrine
are still very much lost in the legal detail.o
Simon Young, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia.
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